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
## **Albania and the Albanian Question After the World War I**

**(November 1, 1918-November 9, 1921**

**International status, borders and state building)**

### **RESUMÉ**

The monograph *Albania and the Albanian Question After the World War I (November 1, 1918-November 9, 1921,- International status, borders and state building)* constitutes an effort to examine the political history of Albania covering a stretch of time from the end of World War I until the 9th of November 1921, a date when the final international status and the borders of this state were determined. In addition to the political history, the monograph meticulously treats the diplomatic management of the post World War I Albanian question in the Peace Conference in Paris and in the subsequent Conference of the Ambassadors until the status and the borders were ultimately settled in principle, on the 9th of November 1921. In the course of his study, the author made use of lot of information accessible in the Public Record Office (National Archives in United Kingdom), the stock of books of the Foreign Office, manuscripts preserved in the library of London School of Economics and Political Science, the published documents of the Main Archive of the State of the Republic of Albania, as well as a lot of published archive Italian, British, and American sources. Thus, this book exposes the international, political, cultural and to a lesser extent, social cultural history of Albania and the Albanian question in a period of three years.



The main focus of this book is the treatment of the Albanian question in the Conference of Paris. As a matter of fact, the Albanian question was considered in three ordered and parallel international events which happened in three-years: The Peace Conference of Paris, the League of Nations and the Conference of the Ambassadors. Every parallel or subsequent treatment of the Albanian question was related to and conditioned by the fundamental decisions of the peacemakers assembled in the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919. Certain instances were set up

by the high Forum of Peace and the Supreme Council and were assigned with the task of sorting out the social questions raised by war, the Albanian question included. In this conference the Albanian question was considered within the frame of the Adriatic and the Balkan questions. Within this international investigation, in the most confusing way, Albania and its question was related to a number of previous international acts and to the complicated knot of a secret diplomacy which was being opened to a different world with difficulty. During the World War I, Albania was a victim of the successive conquests of the pairs in conflict and had nothing to do with them; even so it was regarded just as the losers were. This means that the claims of the Albanian representatives to have the Albanian state and its national borders recognized were not taken into consideration. On the contrary, Albanian borders settled in 1913 were in danger. On the other hand, Serbia and Greece, the two countries Albania shared its borders with, were considered as winners by the conference, consequently their territorial claims were given priority at the expense of the interests of Albania, in complete contradiction with the principles of self-determination declared with sensation in Paris. This occurred because the policy followed to determine conference decisions was that of punishment for the ex-opponents and the recompense for the allies and the affiliated. Motivated by such interests, the great peace makers violated in some way the principles of their cultural policy and created artificial states whose function was the further strategic punishments of former war enemies. One of the states compensated with priority was the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom, a dearly cost formation, especially for the Albanians.

As a matter of fact, the Albanian question was not settled by the Peace Conference in Paris, which means that Albania was not disintegrated. Italians kept the Albanian people subjugated until August 1920, a period when the Albanians rioted and drew them back to the sea. Following these developments and right after the Preliminary Protocol on the 2nd of August 1920, the Italians militarily withdrew from Albania. Nonetheless, they successfully exercised the policy of the economic penetration and as time elapsed that of the gradual political infiltration. Besides carrying out significant military incursions in the country, until the beginning of 1922, the Yugoslavians controlled a narrow strip of land, sometimes as wide as 15 km within the Albanian borders settled in 1913. The question of the international status of Albania, its borders and the position of the Italian state in the small Balkan country had been theoretically solved long after the Peace Conference through diplomatic agreements, whilst the physical settling of the Albanian borders is a technical and political process which extends beyond the time limits of this study and is not its concern.

In addition to the diplomatic treatment, this study examines the recommencement of the internal political Albanian life after World War I, the governance chronology from December 1918 to December 1921, the constitutional structures upon which the Albanian governments were created and exerted their activities, the process of crystallization of the political parties and their respective programs, the resumption of the inner political confrontation and the beginning of the anti-constitutional activities performed by certain individuals. This monograph shows special consideration to the state and private coordinated efforts to defend the territorial entity of Albania in 1913 against Yugoslavian, Italian and Greek interventions as well as against the destabilizing tendencies that accompanied the revival of the Albanian state and that constituted more than an issue of interventions of the states interested in the disintegration of Albania, an expression of the internal confrontation between the political forces that defended Albania as an extension of the former Turkey and the

freedom-loving political forces that fought for the real future transformation of Albania into a state of democratic and European shape.

November 1st, 1918 has been considered as the date of the commencement of the chronological examination of the events because it marks the beginning of the process of the re-establishment of the international administration in Shkodra, the biggest city of Albania. With it, the cycle of the change of the military occupation in Albania rounds up, and the World War I may be considered as being over in this country. As a concluding date this monograph determines November 9, 1921 a date on which the Allies made the final decision on the status and the borders of Albania. Of all the international documents that concern the recognition of the Albanian state, the decision of November 9, 1921 was of special importance, though it did not ultimately settle all issues related to Albania. The author decided to conclude on this date because the inclusive procedure that began on the 9th of November 1921 is a long and a complicated technical political process. In this book, all the events of the internal plan have been constructed and defined in the function of the international events of Albania.

This monograph has an introduction, 12 chapters, the conclusion and the bibliography. This study is the product of intensive two-year work carried out in the years 2005-2006, a period when the author has been affiliated at the London School of Economics and Political Science at the Centre for the Study of Global Governance (GSGG) as a Research Fellow. During this period, the author intensively carried out research at the Public Record Office (National Archives) in Kew Gardens (London) and at the same time he made use of the richest library of the political and social sciences (LSE) in the United Kingdom and the library of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (University College, London). A summary of the conclusions the author has reached in this monograph has been displayed below:

In the three years following the World War I, the process of the establishment of the Albanian state recommenced in both the internal institutional aspect and the international level. The recognition of its borders and status started. This process recommenced because the first internal efforts that began in 1912, 1913 and 1914 failed due to social, political, religious turmoil, the insurrection that burst in the central Albania, the usurping efforts of Esad Pashe Toptani as well as the development that followed when the World War I broke up. Montenegrin and Serbian invasion, and the subsequent Austro-Hungarian, French and Italian ones wiped out the institutional structures of the first Albanian state established after the liberation of the country from the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, after the disintegration of the Montenegrin and Serbian armies, the areas under the Austro-Hungarian, French and Italian rule experienced peaceful periods and the social, cultural life of the Albanians considerably progressed. This can be explained by the fact that Austro-Hungarian, French and Italian rule fundamentally differed from the old ottoman occupation and the rapacious invasions of the new Balkan countries. This progress was noticed in the strategic occupied areas under which the economic, cultural and educational life of the Albanian people agreeably developed compared to their life during the Turkish period. It can be stated that in the Austro-Hungarian and French areas, the Albanian people experienced a second period of revival in the cultural and educational aspect. In some way, the coming of the Austro-Hungarians was welcomed by a number of Albanians for several reasons: first, they drove the Serbian and Montenegrin armies out of Albania and Kosovo; second, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was the main architect of the creation of the Albanian state, third, Austrians guaranteed a limited internal autonomy, under which a civil administration was run by Albanians. Besides, the language employed was Albanian, a number of roads, bridges, and small

railways were built, Albanian schools were opened and financed, books and newspapers were published and supported in the Albanian language, Albanian students were sent to Austrian schools. Similar political, cultural, educational developments occurred in other areas of Albania, in the district of Korça which was under the rule of the rival power, France. Progressive development was noticed in the Italian area, some important communication lines were constructed.

Because of all these developments, the internal Albanian recommencement of the 1918 was not similar to that of the 1912; the 1918 recommencement was based on a wider foundation of the human, educational and cultural sources. Yet, from the economic viewpoint, Albania was a country that lacked the essential capacity to reproduce the indispensable capital which could help it to come out of the sub-developed state. A very grave problem the country was faced with was the educational and cultural backwardness, a result of country's bad governance by the Turks who prohibited education in the Albanian language. The low educational level, the widespread illiteracy and the unlimited power the beys (landlords) enjoyed in various counties made it very difficult to establish a modern democratic and parliamentary governing system. Another very acute problem which our country was to face was the social problem. There was a special need for an agrarian reform susceptible in the south in particular where the agrarian problem intertwined with the religious question because the beys enriched by the former empire owned most lands whereas Christian peasants, be them Greek or Albanian ones, owned nothing.

On the other hand, in the inter-Balkan aspect, Albania was confronted in a more or less similar way with similar difficulties and similar actors, who were now under a stricter control of the allies.

In this monograph, the period under consideration is one of the most important periods in the national history because many genuine intellectuals and nobles, well-educated mainly in the west, became well-aware of the fact that unity contributes to the enlargement of small things, lack of unity can destroy the biggest and offered their contribution to the guidance of the Albanian people.

Perhaps for the first time, this was the period when the Albanian people represented by this civic intellectual responsible class knew how to have influence on the decision making of the internal European policy, how to preserve at least what was won in 1913 and how to bring about the inclusion of some provinces unjustly annexed that year in the diplomatic agendas.

In this respect, a very special role was played by the Albanian patriots who were obliged to immigrate to USA after 1900. Based on the record statistics which the author could find in the British archives, almost all emigrants of that period were all Christians of the Orthodox Church from Southern Albania. Educated with the philosophy of freedom, they played a particular role in the defence of the Albanian question at the international organisms in the USA government. Some of them came back to Albania with a clear and ideal intention in their mind: the fundamental transformation of the situation in Albania through immediate political, institutional, and social reforms in order that the political and economic power of the beys could deteriorate and grow weaker. They wished that the new intellectual patriotic forces which were democratically oriented towards west had become a significant voice in the country's representation. Such an abrupt transformation resulted unrealizable. One of the reasons of the limited impact of that imitative should be searched in the lack of effective coordination between the nucleuses oriented towards progress in the North of the country.

However, for the first time, in the judgment of the outstanding minds of the intellectual class, the need for the new orientation of new Albania in the external policy began to be outlined in these years. It was a need towards the Anglo-American orientation, i.e. the need to find support in the United Kingdom or even in the USA. The disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire by the end of the World War I deprived Albanians in general and Albanian Catholicism in particular of the historical protector of their rights exactly at the moment when this country was liberated from the heavy burden which the Tsarist Russia, the protector of the Slavic and Greek world in the Balkans was exerting upon the re-born Albania. When the talks in the Peace Conference started, Albania was in a very difficult position due to the absence of the protectors of its interests in the international stage, the Austro-Hungary, and the unfair deviation of Italy from its position declared in 1917 in the defence of ethnic Albania. As a matter of fact, the Albanian patriots who relied mainly on the former dual empire in some way, happened to be disoriented after the war, and some were victims of the wrong political reflections. Above all, the substitution of the pro-Austrian orientation with the pro-Italian one did not result well-targeted due to both the quite different intentions of Italy in Albania and the differences in the amount of understanding and susceptibility of the Austrians and Italians towards the Albanian question.

The changes in the course Italy was following along the whole stretch of time under examination were due to the difficulties it encountered in the fulfilment of all its claims in the Adriatic because of the opposition of President Wilson. Whenever Italy found it impossible to realize its objectives in the North of the Adriatic, it tried to satisfy them through compensations in Albania. That's why the Italian state tended to find quick solutions by making deals with its neighbours rather than persisting to defend Albania of the 1913.

The distorted balance in the international arena after World War I laid before the leaders for social reconstruction a new flexible re-orientation, rooted in a new logic which had to conform to the geo-political transformations in Europe, the new rapports created between the Allies, the new positioning of old and new Balkan powers and so on. But this leadership which was not unified because of the lack of state heritage did not act as a unit on its own with a new strategic technically elaborated plan. The ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Albanian state was an imaginary "building" with no sort of structure. For this reason, in this very complicated political period, when international balances were being established, Albania did not represent itself with a unified and professionally elaborated external policy. What the Albanian government did not do, was done by the visionary and enthusiastic individuals who were unfortunately few. A very important role in the nourishment of such an aspiration was played by the Archbishop of Shkodra, Father Jak Serreqi, who asked from the British representatives in Shkodra to have this city and the entire Albania under their control. On the other hand, Mehmet Konica, Dr. Turtulli and Mit'hat Frasheri asked for the American protection, in the absence of this protection, they asked for the British guard.

However their voice remained isolated in the desert, within what can be called the country's upper class made up of differently oriented persons conditioned by their cultural and educational formation, their preliminary interconnections with states that had formerly ruled or influenced Albania because of their old and new economic interests in the country.

What is more, small Albania and the Albanians who tried to represent it found it very difficult to change the old and new courses of their orientations towards the Big Powers. The biggest difficulty for Albania was the backwardness inherited from the

rule of the Ottoman Empire. This backwardness had detached Albania from the normal course of the economic, educational, and cultural European progress, had transformed Albania into a ghetto of massive poverty in the heart of the old continent, a country which found it difficult to generate self-governing abilities and to develop institutional orders and states based on law and constitution.

However, beginning from the period this study has under consideration, policies of relying upon leaders and regional braves gave way to policies based on national interests. This process had really started and could know no reversal. Because of backwardness and lack of cultural education, this process is a progressive displacement which could not go smooth in Albania. From that time on, it can be noticed that loyalty to different leaders gave way to loyalty to the local government. It is true that Esad Pasha was gradually going out of the political scene, but the seed that yielded the pasha from Tirana was still in the country, and the conditions for recycling and reproduction were yet again fertile in Albania. The only positive changes, whose effects were felt later on, were country's independence from the Ottoman Empire which deprived the old feudal class of the previous political support and the new wind that blew in the old continent after the renowned Declaration of the President Wilson which could not approve of further state obscurantist systems. A very important change relates to new Albanians themselves who were being educated in the west or laic schools run by the Catholic Church and the western countries in Albania.

This progressive relinquishing of the operation mechanism of the Albanian and regional policy from the old leaders to the Albanian youths, was hindered by the harsh rivalry between the Kingdom of Italy and the SCS Kingdom and ultimately by the creation of a permanent tumult by Greece in the south of Albania. The Albanian political leaders could not overcome the difficulties laid by this rivalry and interference by the creating an official pro-British or pro-American lobe which could make possible the protection the country from other Powers, far from regional interests.

For all these reasons, the voice in the defence of Albania in the Peace Conference was not a single one and the vision for the reconstruction of new Albania was not the one which should be. This brought about a minimal susceptibility of the peace makers in decision making as well as governmental fragmentation in the country in space and time. Above all, lack of internal consensus to link Albania of the 1918, 1919, 1920 to Albania of the 1913, 1914 from the institutional point of view, critically damaged the efforts for peaceful, logical, and monitoring reconstruction of state constitutional institutions. It brought about interior confusion in the so-called Albanian political class which for approximately a 10 year-period created a wider space for the intervention of the Balkan and the Adriatic powers at the expense of Albania and contributed to the prolongation of the procedures for the solution of the international status and the Albanian state borders for three years, initially political, later on legal.

The Albanian leadership committed a grave technical mistake by giving support to the political demand: it detached the question of status recognition of Albania from Albania itself as a state already created, internationally recognized in 1913 and institutionalized in 1914. It can not be supposed that such a demand did not exist, still, by being not linked to the heritage of that period, to the institution of the Prince, to the fundamental state statute outlined at that time by Powers, to governing and so on, the above mentioned demand lost its weight, created an extended institutional vacuum, made room for the revival of the adventurers, gave birth to youngsters, enabled mal-interpretations, and created extended political instability. In the external plan, it added to the positive interpretation of the Secret London Treaty, to the bad interpretations of the subsequent operative decisions of the Supreme Council of

Allies as well as to the almost infinite interconnection of the Albanian question with the Adriatic question. Nevertheless, those Albanian leaders who thought about it were few; besides, there was no common will to follow the legality of the 1914 with or without prince Wied. The establishment of Turhan Pasha at the head of the government in December 1918 did not complete the whole spectrum of the restitution of the pre-war legality. Most of all, a government put under the pressure of or, under certain circumstances, under the control of one of the Powers interested in and the signer of the Secret London Treaty made quite ineffective the effort for the revival and the restitution of legality. Contrary to what has been written so far, according to the author, there is no evidence to prove that the amount of control exerted on the Transitory Government of Durres by the invading Italian authorities was to the level of a puppet government. Obviously, the area where the Transitory Government of Durres exerted its activity was completely limited and the imposing power of the Italian forces was great. On the other hand, the foundation upon which this government was established was a certain agreement intended to have reciprocal assistance in the international level, completely violated by the Italian part. Albanian politicians in the government of Durres defended the national question with dignity in all international instances, by even opposing the attitude of Italy. This government gradually lost its effectiveness and understanding because of its initial start and the situation in the base. Its replacement after the Congress of Lushnja was quite logical and progressive.

In a certain way, the Congress of Lushnja did not completely settle the question of the status of self-determination in 1914. This process was not decidedly accompanied with the restoration of legality in the period under discussion by outlining in this way the route for further political talks in the internal aspect, what's more, in the external aspect. However, it should be borne in mind that the political circumstances in 1920 could not promote debates which would impose on the tribal leaders which way to follow. The situation asked for instant short-term solutions and long-term institutional relations. The Albanian reality was very complicated and could not ensure an immediate appropriate functional solution. As a matter of fact, in the five years that followed, Albania systematically experienced political turmoil which came to an end only after the intervention of the King Zog. In the aspect of international relation, the monograph considers the Albanian question, its status and borders in a three-year-stretch of time in three international forums, two of which, the Peace Conference in Paris and the Conference of Ambassadors were functionally and institutionally related. The monograph intends to chronologically systematize the course of the Albanian question and to more or less analyze the attitude of the Allies and the Associated Powers from the first introduction presentation of the government of Durres and the countries interested in the Albanian question to November 9, 1921, when the status of Albania was "de jure" determined. It should be pointed out for more than two years (April 1919 to November 12, 1920, a date when Rapallo Treatment was signed) the question of Albania was not treated as a question in itself but as part of major questions which the big peacemakers dealt with. Why is it so? Irrespective of the New Doctrine President Wilson promoted at the end of World War I, some of the important questions instigated and carried on after the war continued to be considered in the light of the principles of the Old Diplomacy. It is quite clear that in the period of transition between the two conceptions of the work of the diplomacy, challenges acquired two-fold treatments. The second reason has to do with the fact that from the beginning of the Peace Conference, the Allies had not reached any special agreement with reference to Albania. As for the Albanian question integrated in the question of the Adriatic or that of Greece no positive

concrete achievement was reached. The first positive turn that changed at least the course of the treatment of the Albanian question was made by the American note, in March 6, 1920. It stated that the Albanian question should not be included in the common discussions between Italy and Yugoslavia. Besides, President Wilson did not approve of fact that the Albanian territories both in the North and South of Albania could be used as territorial compensations for the territories Italy and Greece were deprived of somewhere else. The intervention of the American government constitutes the first powerful strike against the Secret London Treaty and at the same time the first relegation of Tittoni-Venizelos agreement. Essentially, the persistence of President Wilson concerning the application of the principle of self-determination led to the capitulation of Italy to Albania in the first three months of 1920. This intervention brought about the archiving of the British-French-Italian plan about splitting up Albania and the close of the peace conference without reaching an agreement on the Albanian question. Practically, in this way Albania avoided its splitting up. The change in the American attitude incorporated three components: first, the one related to the philosophy which led the current American Foreign policy, the philosophy of peoples' freedom and self-determination, second, in the peace negotiations the team of the American experts ever enriched the technical knowledge and its composing elements, third, the very undeniable contribution made by the Greek Church community to enlighten the ethnic-cultural and political reality in the Southern Albania, primarily, that of the emigrants in USA and Rumania, especially the contribution of brothers Faik and Mehmet Konica.

Even though, in the Peace Conference, Albania avoided its invasion, it was still invaded by foreign armies. At that moment, the initiative taken by the nationalist leaders concerning the political re-organization of the country and the commencement of the liberating preparations was decisive. The Congress of Lushnja opened Albania the way towards the formation of the state. The elections led to the first summoning of the National Legislative Assembly in Tirana, in March 27, 1922 and the beginning of the parliamentary life. The creation of the Regency made up of representatives from the four religious beliefs in Albania was a keen solution to keep the country's balance and stability. The foundation of the Committee of the National Defence served as an institution to determine state's integrity, a very important instrument for the liberation of the country. This was the first step that made Italians leave Albania and it stopped Serbs from their further progress.

A very important event in 1920 was the admission of Albania in the League of Nations in December 17, 1920. This act served as a complete turn for the benefit of the country because Albania was recognized as an independent and sovereign state. This step leads to professional treatment of a problem which was vague in the current international right. This means that the admission of a country in the League of Nations was similar to the recognition of this country by the states that approved of its participation in this international organ. That was the puzzle the Allies tried to give a political and juridical solution. Of course, this mere technical problem was not the only one to be sorted out by the Allies about Albania; however, untying such a juridical knot facilitated the political judgment and neutralized all efforts of the countries that were interested in keeping Albania politically and militarily dependent.

The analysis of the British attitude is very important. Great Britain was a Power with no direct interests in Albania. It had a leading position in the efforts to sort out problems carried on from World War I, for this reason it was interested in securing stability all over the old continent. It should be pointed out that from the beginning of the Peace Conference on, until the determination of the status of Albania, a certain flow in the attitude of the FO about Albania can be noticed. This book provides

detailed information concerning the attitude FO kept at certain periods and at the same time the dynamics of this stand. This flow was determined by the need to preserve the relationship with the main Ally Powers interested in the region and in Albania and had the same support later on in the areas where the United Kingdom defended its own empire interests. Therefore, the FO foreign policy was initially guided by the need to support France in the Conference which, on the other hand, supported Greek and Yugoslav candidates. Later on, the support that the Prime Minister Veniselos gave the Greek question in the Peace Conference played a special role towards a pro-Greek orientation. The transformation of the British attitude was quite gradual, often stepping to and fro, depending on the development of the major issues related to the Albanian question and entwined with the application of the principles of the New Diplomacy by FO. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that from the very beginning, the British were not in favour of the unfair Yugoslavian pretensions about Northern Albania whereas Southern Albania was in favour of giving the biggest part of the territory of Southern Albania to Greece. Together with the French diplomacy, and faced with the constant opposition of the American diplomacy, it completely changed this attitude on this issue by the end of that period. Special role in this respect played the reliable information obtained especially by the Consul Eyres. It showed that the population in this area was pleased with the Albanian Government of Tirana of the 1921 and the Eastern-Church Albanian population was an existing reality, it even constituted the majority in this province. When the Albanian government requested from the Council of the Leagues of Nations a final solution to the questions related to Albania and the issue was forwarded in the Conference of Ambassadors by the end of April 1921, it can be assumed that the British diplomacy had decided to settle the question as soon as possible, the only procedural worry was the juridical solution of the problem. At the political level, the overcoming of the last and insincere insistence of Italy and the possibility of unexpected blow by the irresponsible Balkan states (Greece and Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom) constituted a problem in itself. An essential distinction between Greece and the SCS Kingdom should be drawn here. Being at the head of the Greek government, Veniselos assisted the Allies to have a complete control over the Greek policy about Southern Albania, utterly avoiding the uncontrolled military actions of the extremists. Quite the contrary can be said about the government of Beograd. Controlled by the most powerful Serbian clans, its policy and the military actions against Northern Albania were completely unmanageable by the Ally Powers. The different treatment and the seriousness with which the British diplomacy led by Earl Curzon dealt with the Albanian question in the last months before its final solution met with the insisting request and the refusal of Lord Curzon, who held that the Albanian question was to be considered as part of the general solution of the questions of the Adriatic and the Balkan.

A far as Italy is concerned, it can be stated that it ultimately resigned from the 1915 Secret Treaty of London (this is not an absolute statement because the Italian foreign policy towards Albania changed a lot even within one and the same governmental cabinet) but it can be assumed that when Giovanni Giolitti came to power, he supported 1913 border decision because it coincided with his interests that had to do with elimination of the Yugoslav or Greek influence on the eastern coast of the Adriatic. Nevertheless, in general, when the Albanian question was finally being settled, the Italian diplomacy was not sincere enough with both the negotiating Ally Powers and the aspiration of the Albanian people. It was exactly the intervention of Lord Curzon that, in the three last months before status determination, managed to sort out the legal and sincere stand of Italy from the insincere attitude which aimed at

limiting the independence of Albania. It can be stated that the Italian foreign policy towards Albania at the level of the authority of the big negotiating power completely changed. Otherwise, from the point of view of its minimal intentions (the limitation of the Greek and Serbian influence on Albania), their policy attained its aim. Throughout their three-year activity, the Italian policy makers committed many mistakes in their judgments and analyses about Albania. In complete contradiction with the national interests of the Albanian people, they started with the effort to illogically put the government of Durres under their control, transform Albania into placdarm for the aggression of the Montenegrin nationalists against the kingdom of SKS, infinitely insisted to apply the stipulation of the London Treaty, tried to keep the ill-famed treaty in shade, made efforts to prevent the assembly of the Congress of Lushnja to the benefit of the fully controlled government of Durres, and by the end of its control, tried to influence the overthrowing of the government of Sulejman Delvina by financing the desperate effort of the supporters of Esad Pasha , and in general tried to infinitely extend the solution of the Albanian questioning in their own interests at the level of the diplomacy of Big powers. The above mentioned facts are indexes of not only the loss of Albanians' faith in the Italian strategy, but also of the short-sighted, selfish, irrational policy of the Italians. However, when the Council of Ambassadors of the Ally Powers convened in Paris, the British representative still claimed southern Albanian territories, exactly the area that lay south of Tittoni-Veniselos line, Greece because he had the advice of the British experts. But the Italians and the French opposed him. The British had time enough to ask their experts to re-examine the question and then give the best possible verdict about settlement that included south of Albania within the Albanian state. In principle, the borders of 1913 were left unimpaired and the experts were assigned the task to propose modifications in the East and North in order that border settlement could seem logical. Concerning Albania, the recommendations of the experts could not give results as long as they were accompanied with further territorial splitting in the East and did nothing to include two very important tribes of the Highland of Hoti and Gruda in Albania. Keeping Hoti and Gruda out of the Albanian territories for the second time deprived Shkodra and the Albanian Catholicism of two important pivots of energy and political, traditional weight in Albania. (Unfortunately, the question of Triepshi and Koja was left in the shadow, since as can be assumed, because of an earlier annexing of these two Highland tribes by Montenegro, i.e. after the Balkan Crisis in the years 1875-1878, it was considered as being overcome by the British diplomacy). In the East, the need to create a practical basin of communication and establishing economic relationship in the cities and the surrounding areas of Dibra and Prizren deprived Albania of 400 square km territory inhabited by autochthon Albanian population.

This was the theoretical epilogue of the question of the borders of the Albanian state in the Conference of Ambassadors. The technical solution is a true odyssey which would last for some other years. Beginning from 1922, all Yugoslavian and Greek troops left the Albanian territory. But it is only in July 30, 1926 when Greece, the Kingdom of SCS together with Great Britain, France and Italy signed the final agreement which recognized the Albanian borders. Furthermore, the problems of the internal immaturity of the democratic institutions were supplemented with different Italian and Yugoslavian intrigues of various intensity which made the process of state stabilization very difficult to achieve.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### 1. Introduction

### 2. Military and political circumstances in Albania after World War I

Decisions of the War Supreme Council of the Ally Powers in Versace about the treatment of the Albanian Question

### 3. The Adriatic Question

### 4. Shkodra after World War I

#### 4.1 Social Situation and international relations in Shkodra after World War I

#### 4.2 Attempts of Shkodra and its provinces to become part of Albania

#### 4.3 The foundation of "Vllaznia" Association in February 16, 1919

#### 4.4 The celebration of November 29, 1919

### 5. The Italian-Serbian rivalry and its consequences in the political life of the country

### 6. The Congress of Lushnja and its importance

### 7. Shkodra put under the control of the Government of Tirana

### 8. The mode of governing determined in the Congress of Lushnja

### 9. The situation in Korca

### 10. Vlorë War

11. War against the military Yugoslavian intervention in the territories of Dibra and Malesi e Madhe. The diplomatic treatment of this question.

### 12 .Admission of Albania in the League of Nation

### 13. Internal political developments in Albania during the years 1920-1921

#### 13.1 The incident of Korca

#### 13.2 Developments in Himare

#### 13.3 The Revolt of Mirdita

**13.4** The fall of Iliaz Vrioni government and the policy of “coup de tat” by the end of 1921

**13.5** The activity of the Chamber of Deputies

**13.6** “Atdheu” Federation

**14.** Treatment of the Albanian question and the status of the Albanian state in 1921 by the diplomacy of Big Powers

**15.** Conclusions

Appendix

Bibliography

Resume in English